

1 WO  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6

7 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
8 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

9 Mary Joann Jones,

No. CV-19-02854-PHX-ESW

10 Plaintiff,

11 **ORDER**

12 v.

13 Commissioner of the Social Security  
14 Administration,

15 Defendant.

16  
17  
18 On May 19, 2020, the Court issued an Order reversing the Social Security  
19 Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability  
20 insurance benefits and remanding the matter to the Commissioner of Social Security for  
21 an immediate award of benefits. (Doc. 23). Pending before the Court is the  
22 Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  
23 Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 25). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 19), to which the  
24 Commissioner has not replied.

25 Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file a  
26 “motion to alter or amend a judgment.” The Ninth Circuit has explained that  
27 “[s]ince specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not  
28 listed in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable  
discretion in granting or denying the motion.” *McDowell v.*

*Calderon*, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). But amending a judgment after its entry remains “an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law. *Id.*

10        *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron*, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) “may not be  
11        used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have  
12        been made prior to the entry of judgment.” *Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker*, 554 U.S. 471,  
13        485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). A Rule 59(e) “motion is not a substitute for appeal and  
14        does not allow the unhappy litigant to reargue the case.” *Bollenbacher v. Comm'r of Soc.*  
15        *Sec.*, 621 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

16        In its May 19, 2020 Order, the Court concluded that the Administrative Law Judge  
17        (“ALJ”) discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without providing specific and  
18        legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 23 at 6-9). The  
19        Commissioner asserts that the Court committed clear error by remanding the matter for  
20        an award of benefits instead of further proceedings. (Doc. 25). According to the  
21        Commissioner, the Court failed to adequately analyze whether there are any outstanding  
22        issues on which further administrative proceedings would be useful. (*Id.* at 3-8). The  
23        Commissioner does not argue that the record is incomplete. Instead, the Commissioner  
24        argues that there are a number of inconsistencies in the record that should be addressed  
25        by the ALJ. The Court affirms its implicit finding that the record in this matter is fully  
26        developed.<sup>1</sup> “Given this fully developed record, the admission of more evidence would

<sup>1</sup> This finding is implicit in the Court's statement "After examining the record, the Court finds no outstanding issues of fact to be resolved through further proceedings." (Doc. 23 at 9).

1 not be ‘enlightening,’ *Treichler*, 775 F.3d at 1101, and ‘remand for the purpose of  
2 allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan [does not qualify] as a remand for a ‘useful  
3 purpose,’ *Garrison*, 759 F.3d at 1021.” *Henderson v. Berryhill*, 691 F. App’x 384, 386  
4 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing *Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th  
5 Cir. 2014) and *Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)). Further,  
6 although there may be some doubt in the record as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the  
7 Court affirms its finding that there is not “serious doubt.” (Doc. 23 at 10). Because (i)  
8 the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom  
9 testimony, (ii) the record is fully developed and there are no outstanding issues that must  
10 be resolved before a disability determination can be made (i.e. further administrative  
11 proceedings would not be useful), (iii) crediting Plaintiff’s testimony as true would  
12 require the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled on remand, and (iv) there is not “serious doubt”  
13 as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court did not commit clear error by exercising its  
14 discretion to remand this case for an award of benefits. *See Garrison*, 759 F.3d at 1020  
15 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of  
16 discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when all of these  
17 conditions are met”). The Court concludes that the Commissioner has not presented a  
18 valid basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief. Accordingly,

19 **IT IS ORDERED** denying the Commissioner’s “Motion to Alter or Amend  
20 Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)” (Doc. 25).

21 Dated this 24th day of July, 2020.

22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



---

Honorable Eileen S. Willett  
United States Magistrate Judge